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5 Meanings of the unmarked:
how ‘default’ person reference does
more than just refer
N. J. Enfield
It’s not that somebody is ordinary, it’s perhaps that that’s what their business is. And it
takes work, as any other business does. (Harvey Sacks, Spring 1970, Lecture 1)
The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their sim-
plicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something – because it is always before
one’s eyes.) The real foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all. Unless that
fact has at some time struck him. – And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once
seen, is most striking and most powerful. (Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1953, Philosophical
Investigations §1.129)
This chapter explores one way in which members of a culture work to achieve
the appearance of ordinariness, and in so doing render invisible their most
heartfelt concerns. The target locus of behaviour is referential practice, in
particular verbal reference to persons in everyday conversation. In this domain,
as in any other, to be or act ordinary is to attract no special attention to that way
of being or acting. For instance, by dressing in overalls, a plumber at work
chooses the default, unmarked course of action. He will not be sanctioned or
even commented upon for doing so (unlike, say, were he to wear a dress).
When we follow a default course of action in this way, we are in one sense not
doing anything special; indeed we may be taken not to be ‘doing’ anything at
all. But since it takes work to pull off the invisible appearance of ordinariness,
even when our manners of behaviour are rendered literally unremarkable by
their conformity, we are nevertheless always doing something by choosing just
those manners of behaviour. Along these lines, this chapter argues that default
practices of person reference do more than just refer. They instantiate and
stabilize culture-specific views of the person. But by their very design, these
practices render their own meaning difficult to detect, shrouded in the veil of
ordinariness.
In the use and interpretation of language, one key mechanism turns on a
distinction between the ordinary and the exceptional. This is the contrast
between default and marked formulation of spoken utterances. A default
referential formulation is a way of phrasing reference (e.g., to a person,
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place, thing) that will be taken to be the standard, nothing-special-intended
way of saying it (e.g., New York as opposed to The Big Apple, John as
opposed to His Majesty, the dog as opposed to the hound ). As the term
suggests, a default formulation will represent a path of least cognitive
resistance for both the production and comprehension of a referential
expression. The term default implies that for a speaker the formulation is
virtually automatic, in the absence of any special consideration to selection
of that manner of formulation as opposed to some other conceivable one
(hence the Prague School’s term automatization; Hanks 1990; Havra´nek
1964/1932:9). It’s the format you pick when you don’t have any special
reason to care how the thing you want to say gets said. Given the perhaps
infinite number of possible ways of formulating an utterance, the existence of
defaults for usage minimizes processing by providing a single, ever-present
opt-out. By contrast, a marked (that is, pragmatically marked)1 referential
formulation is defined as an expressive departure from the default (e.g., his
majesty instead of John or he). Its foregrounded nature serves to alert the
listener’s attention (Hanks 1990; Havra´nek 1964/1932:10). By producing an
‘unusual’ formulation, a speaker displays some special effort, implying their
having selected just that formulation for a reason, thereby inviting the lis-
tener to wonder why, and eliciting an enriched interpretation (Grice 1975,
1989; Levinson 2000).
In their seminal analyses of person reference in English conversation,
Sacks and Schegloff (1979, this volume; cf. Schegloff 1996a) rely crucially
on this logic of informational contrast between default versus marked
manners of referential formulation. Because the default manner of for-
mulation attracts no special attention or enriched interpretation, it is argued
to be making literally no contribution to the interaction apart from estab-
lishing reference to an individual person. By contrast, with a marked for-
mulation, ‘something else in addition to referring is being done’ (Schegloff
1996a: 439), above and beyond the mere informational imperatives of
communication (e.g., with his majesty, I am not just referring to John, but
may also be complaining about him; cf. Stivers, this volume). But while a
default formulation may not be doing any special, foregrounded or topical
communicative work in an interaction, I argue that it may be systematically
doing more than merely achieving reference. The evidence comes from the
system of person reference in Lao, a Southwestern Tai language of Laos,
1 Haspelmath (2006) advises against any use of the term ‘marked’ due to its long list of different
meanings and uses in the literature (cf. Zwicky 1978; Gair 1988, inter alia). He suggests that all
relevant senses of marked are handled by independently existing terms/concepts. I appreciate
the need for care, but nevertheless find the term handy. See the introduction to this book for
further discussion of defaults, markedness, and the like.
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Thailand, and Cambodia. Data are from video recordings of natural con-
versation.
In Lao, default forms of person reference explicitly encode kin-based and
other hierarchical social relations between speakers and person referents. As in
many other languages (see chapters in this volume), these default formats for
person reference publicize key cultural values every time they are used. By
giving off information about relative social positioning, these habitual person-
reference formats display speakers’ commitments to socially generalized
values, and through this help in reproducing, maintaining and stabilizing those
values. Attention to the details of linguistic structure and its deployment in
face-to-face interaction illuminates questions at the heart of social anthro-
pology. In the moment-by-moment flow of human sociality, communication
constitutes social action on multiple levels, not only in the foreground of
attention, but also in the disattended, quietly purring background machinery of
a culture’s practiced norms.
5.1 The Lao system of person reference
To refer to a person in conversation, a Lao speaker has many possible alter-
native formulations to choose from. The complexities of this set of alternatives
concern distinctions of social hierarchy, as defined by (classificatory) kinship
and other factors that determine relative position of individuals in social
structure.
First a point of clarification about the social domain of focus in this
chapter. There is significant diversity in the range of social situations a Lao-
speaking individual will find themselves in, and this uneven social – inter-
actional landscape is rapidly evolving in a new, modern world (cf. Evans
1999, 2002; Rehbein 2004). Individuals have to apply and negotiate multiple
distinct sets of conventions for communication, both ritual and mundane,
depending on context. These important complexities are, however, beyond
the scope of this chapter. For the argument presented here, I restrict the
analysis to maximally informal conversations in village settings. This may
be considered the basic, primordial setting for human interaction for most
Lao speakers. It approximates a general standard for informal interaction in
the home and family environment, and as such represents the typical setting
for early socialization, and thus the base from which other, marked types of
social – interactional arrangement may be considered departures. It is the
common interactional standard in which the generic attitudes of Mead’s
(1934) ‘generalized other’ are grounded. In more formal or otherwise con-
strained situation types, these underlying interactional norms – for example,
the conventions of person reference – may be manipulated for special effect.
Aspects of Lao that express social – hierarchical distinctions are a site of
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significant sociolinguistic dynamism, thanks to patterns of social mobility
and modernization associated with education and global cultural trends.
These patterns of rich variation in modern Lao society, and the formally
constrained registers of traditional ritual life, are set aside here, but will
constitute an important later elaboration on the topic of Lao person refer-
ence.
5.1.1 Ethnographic background to the hierarchical stance in
Lao social organization
The vagaries of Lao person reference are one reflex of a strong streak of
verticality or ‘authority ranking’ (Fiske 1992) in Lao socio-cultural organi-
zation. At the kernel of this hierarchical system is a special attention to the
distinction in age between siblings, and a range of ways in which this is
reflected in social practice, both linguistic and otherwise. To illustrate, con-
sider a number of linguistic and ethnographic observations of some of the
consequences of relative age status between the two girls in Figure 5.1.
A. These two sisters use different terms to describe their relationship to the
other: There is no word in Lao meaning ‘sister’, the available kin terms
obligatorily marking difference of age: K is P’s noong4 ‘younger sibling’,
Figure 5.1 Siblings: K (left) is P’s younger sister
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P is K’s qu`aj4 ‘elder sister’. (For explication of the many ways in which
this sibling age distinction is further reflected in the semantics of the Lao
system of kin terminology, see Enfield 2005: 54–6.)
B. Elder and younger siblings normally use different pronouns with each
other, the elder using the bare, ‘non respect’ forms kuu3 ‘I’ and mu`ng2
‘you’, the younger using polite forms khooj5 ‘I’ and caw4 ‘you’. (See
below and Enfield 2006b; note that immediately adjacent siblings are
sometimes exceptional in this regard, reciprocally using the non-respect
pronominal forms.)
C. Elder and younger siblings use distinct formats for addressing and
referring to the other by name, adding different social – hierarchical name
titles in accordance with the level of ‘respect’ displayed by the choice of
pronominal in (B), above: Here, the elder will prefix the younger’s name
with the ‘female non-respect’ form qii1-, the younger will prefix the
elder’s name with the ‘elder sister’ form qu`aj4- (see below sections for
elaboration).
D. Elder and younger siblings have different rights and responsibilities in
domestic life. Elder siblings are often directly responsible for the care of
younger siblings, especially at a very young age (from, say, 1–4). At the
same time, as soon as younger siblings become ‘useful’, an elder sibling
may freely delegate the younger to carry out chores.
E. If the younger of these two girls is married before the elder, she is
required to perform a ritual of atonement, apparently for making her
appear a spinster.
F. There are constraints on marriage defined in terms of sibling order (see
Enfield 2005 for details): If the elder is married, the younger may marry
her husband’s brother, but only if he is the younger brother, not if he is the
older; If the children or grandchildren of these two girls want to marry
(i.e., as cousins or second-cousins), it is permissible only if the male of
the pair is in the elder girl’s line – that is, the male should be on the
‘higher’ line, irrespective of absolute age.
G. The first-born child gains a special prominence via the practice of
teknonymy (Le´vi-Strauss 1969: 349, see below), by which the parents
come to be known by his or her name.
H. The last-born is treated differently in that they traditionally inherit the
family home and much of the land, and are expected to live with the
parents in their old age.
This outline of some practices associated with the simple distinction in age/
order between siblings should suffice to give a sense of the degree of impor-
tance in Lao social practice of kin-derived hierarchical order. Let’s now turn to
a more focused consideration of the linguistic practices implicated by this. I
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begin with a sketch of two basic means for referring to people: pronouns and
names.
5.1.2 Pronouns
True pronouns in Lao encode four levels of politeness, in each of the first-,
second- and third-person singular forms (cf. Enfield 2006b). The system is
typical in mainland Southeast Asia (Cooke 1968).2
Fewer distinctions are made in the plural. None of the forms encode the sex
of the referent. One way of thinking about the distinctions encoded here is of
the more polite second-person forms as successively raising the conceived
status of the addressee, while the more polite first-person forms successively
lower the conceived status of the speaker (Brown and Levinson 1987). This is
reflected, for example, in the etymology of the polite forms khooj5 ‘I’ (else-
where ‘slave’) and caw4 ‘you’ (elsewhere ‘lord’).
Some nominals such as occupational and kin titles function as pronouns (i.e.,
are used for tracking reference through discourse in successive non-initial
mentions), yet without shifting their reference according to who is speaking. In
the following example, the speaker refers to a (present) third person. The
referent is not the speaker’s actual uncle.
Example (1) (Woman is talking about an elder man.)
K khooj5 siø mu`a2 nam2 phoø+luung2
1sg pol irr go with uncle
‘Ipolite will go with himuncle.’
(See Table 5.1.) The next example shows kin terms where one may expect
pronouns, but again unlike pronouns, they do not change their reference in a
given context when a different speaker utters them. Among courting youths,
the boy is qaaj4 ‘older brother’, whether it is him or the girl who utters the word
(mutatis mutandis for noong4 ‘younger sibling’, the girl):3
2 Transcription of Lao here follows International Phonetic Association convention, except for q
(glottal stop), n˜ (palatal nasal), ng (velar nasal), eˆ (mid front vowel), e` (low front vowel), u`
(high back unrounded vowel), o (low back vowel). There is no standard romanization of Lao.
Lexical tones are marked by numerals at end of each syllable: 1 (mid level), 2 (high rising), 3
(low rising), 4 (high falling), 5 (low falling), ø (unstressed). Glosses of examples are according
to the following conventions: 1/2/3 (first/second/third person), dem (demonstrative), dist
(distal), f (female), foc (focus), irr (irrealis), m (male), pcl (particle), pol (polite), resp
(respect), sg (singular), tpc (topic); (n.n) means there is n.n seconds of silence. Kinship
notation follows Parkin (1997:9): F (father), M (mother), B (brother), Z (sister), S (son), D
(daughter), H (husband), W (wife), P (parent), G (sibling), E (spouse), C (child), e (elder), y
(younger).
3 This pattern of use of kin terms among courtiers is distinctly old-fashioned/rustic, and is going
out of date among the urban youth.
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Example (2) (Two youngsters courting.)
B qaaj4 hak1 noong4
eB love yG
‘IeB love youyG.’ (as spoken by young man to young woman)
G noong4 hak1 qaaj4 khu`u`2-kan3
yG love eB too
‘IyG love youeB, too.’ (as spoken by young woman to young man)
It is normal in many contexts for such use of kin terms to persist through a
given stretch of interaction, where a kin term like qaaj4 ‘eB’ will serve as the
form for successive non-initial references – that is, functionally equivalent to
pronouns in English discourse (Fox 1987).
5.1.3 Lao names and name prefixes
Lao full names typically have two components, a first name and a sur-
name (e.g., Kaysone Phomvihan, Phoumi Vongvichit, Khamtai Siphan-
done). The surname is inherited from the father. These full names are
largely derived from the Indic languages, Pali or Sanskrit. They are sel-
dom used for person reference in informal conversation. Nicknames are
normally used instead. These may be shortened from the person’s full
name (e.g., vaat5 from thongsavaat5 or thip1 from thipphacan3) or may
be independently bestowed upon the person in infancy or childhood,
typically on the basis of some attributed physical feature (e.g., tuj4 ‘fat’,
cooj1 ‘skinny’, le`e`5 ‘blackened’, nooj4 ‘small’). A few full names are
monosyllabic, and so are not in need of abbreviation for everyday use; for
example, ke`e`w4, kuq2, moon1. Most names may be used for both men and
women.
Table 5.1 Some commonly used Lao pronounsi
1st 2nd 3rd
Singular Bare kuu3 mu`ng2 man2
Familiar haw2 too3 laaw2
Polite khooj5 caw4 phen1
Formal khaa5-phacaw4 thaan1 thaan1
Plural Bare suu3 khaw3
polite cu-haw2(incl.) cu-caw4 khacaw4
cu-khooj5(excl.)
iThese are the most common pronouns. Further pronouns, and further special
uses of the pronouns in Table 5.1, are beyond the scope of this discussion.
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Teknonymy is common in Laos – the practice by which ‘a person is
called the father, mother, grandfather or grandmother, etc., of one of his
descendents instead of by his own name’ (Le´vi-Strauss 1969:349). When a
first child is born, Lao-speaking parents will come to be called by many as
‘father/mother of X’, where X is the child’s name. This means that many
people effectively acquire a new proper name when their first child is
named.
When Lao speakers refer to people using personal names, in the standard
informal village setting, they attach a type of title prefix to the personal
name. The prefix explicitly encodes the (classificatory) kin or other
relative relation of the referent individual to the speaker. If the referent is
someone ‘not above’ – that is, not (classificatorily) older than – the speaker,
then a non-respect prefix is used. There are two such prefixes, that distin-
guish the sex of the referent. The non-respect female name prefix is qii1,
the male prefix is bak2. These look ‘downward’. Morphosyntactically,
they are a type of nominal classification device (Enfield 2004). They occur
as heads of nominal phrases (and cannot occur alone), taking a range
of modifiers, including demonstratives, adjectives, relative clauses and
names.
While the non-respect prefixes generalize across the variety of conceivable
‘downward-looking’ relations (e.g., younger sibling, nephew, niece, child,
grandchild), referents who are ‘above’ the speaker receive a prefix from a dif-
ferentiated range of name prefixes, selected from the everyday kinship vocabu-
lary (each form also having independent use as a full kin term) (see Table 5.2)
In addition, a number of name prefixes denote the social rank of a referent
(not relative to speaker), for example, as determined by monastic education
(see Table 5.3)
So, if a speaker wants to refer to a thirty-year-old man called Pheˆt1, the
prefix selected will depend, among other things, on the relative social position
of the man to the speaker (3a – c) or the man’s absolute status (3d):
Example (3)
(a) bak1-pheˆt1 – ‘Pheˆt1, a male who is not above me.’
(b) qaaj4-pheˆt1 – ‘Pheˆt1, who is an older brother (to me).’
(c) luung2-pheˆt1 – ‘Pheˆt1, who is an uncle (to me).’
(d) caan3-pheˆt1 – ‘Pheˆt1, who was once an abbot.’
5.1.4 Default formulations of initial references to persons
in Lao conversation
In informal, familiar, village conversation in Lao, the default way to formulate
initial reference to a person is to use the person’s familiar name prefixed by the
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form that appropriately denotes the referent’s social position relative to the
speaker (as in 3a–c). As long as the prefix is of the appropriate level,
the ‘prefix-plus-name’ formulation is the default option, and its deployment in
interaction will pass without special notice.
The following example is from a conversation between twomen, Kou (K) and
Xai (X), in Doune Ian, a village with about 500 inhabitants located some 35 km
northeast of the Lao capital, Vientiane. Kou is about sixty years old, Xai about
forty. Kou is a contemporary of Xai’s father, and is Xai’s classificatory luung2
‘elder uncle’ (PeB). Xai is a bit older than Kou’s eldest child. The example
features an initial reference by Xai to his own younger brother (line 1), followed
by an initial reference by Kou to another man of around Xai’s age (line 2). The
speakers are both older than, thus ‘above’, both the referent individuals.
Accordingly, these speakers formulate their references to these ‘lower males’ by
attaching the non-respect male prefix bak2 to the referents’ names:
Example (4) (Xai and Kou are discussing possible routes for a driving trip
planned for later that day.)
1 X sum1 bak2+tia4 n˜ang2 lat1 paj3 hanø noq1
group m non respþT still cut go there pcl
‘Tia’snon resp lot still take a short cut that way, right?’
2 K paj3 haa3 baan4 bak2+laa2 hanø
go seek village m non respþL tpc.pcl
‘{The road} goes towards the village of Laanon resp.’
Table 5.2 Some kin-related (‘upward’) name prefixes
Female Male
Elder sibling qu`aj4- qaaj4-
Parent’s elder sibling paa4- luung2-
Mother’s younger sibling saaw3- baaw1-
Father’s younger sibling qaa3- qaaw3-
Parent’s parent pho-tuu4- me`-tuu4-
Table 5.3 Some rank/role denoting name prefixes
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Nothing in this stretch of conversation indicates that these explicit indications
of ‘non-respect’ are in any way foregrounded in the main communicative
business.
The next example is from a conversation that takes place during a visit by
Keˆeˆt and Kaap, a middle-aged couple, to the house of an older couple
(Grandma and Grandpa) in a somewhat remote village about 50 km outside of
Vientiane. Grandpa is recuperating from injuries sustained when he fell off the
front steps of his house some days earlier. Keˆeˆt and Kaap live in the city of
Vientiane, near Grandma and Grandpa’s son Moon. In this example, Keˆeˆt
reports to Grandma and Grandpa that she had heard the news of Grandpa’s
accident from Grandpa’s son Moon. Keˆeˆt’s formulation of the initial reference
by name to Moon is prefixed by the male non-respect form bak2- (line 1). In
line 2, Keˆeˆt makes subsequent reference to the same individual, using a third-
person singular pronoun, here the ‘lowest’ available (see Table 5.1). This is
appropriate to the register in which the prefix bak2- occurs. This is a Lao
manifestation of a classic sequence of form-occasion alignment (Schegloff
1996a; cf. introduction to this volume, Fox 1987): that is, initial reference form
(full noun phrase) on initial occasion of reference (line 1), subsequent refer-
ence form (reduced pronoun) on subsequent occasion of reference (line 2).
Example (5) (Speaker reports to Moon’s parents that she’d heard news
from Moon in the town.)
1 Keˆeˆt daj4þn˜in2 bak2+moon3
hear m non respþM
‘(I) heard Moonnon resp.’
2 man2 mu`a2 qaw3 ngen2 nam2 khooj5
3sg non resp return take money with 1sg pol
‘Henon resp went to get money from mepolite.’
The precise formulations employed in the two explicit references to Moon, in
boldface, are defined by the social relationship that pertains between him and
the speaker.
The examples so far have featured overt marking of names using non-respect
‘lower’ prefixes. The next example illustrates ‘upward’ directedmarking of person
reference. Here, a woman answers a question as to the location of somebody’s
house. She formulates it as being near the house of an older woman called
Teng. The name is prefixed by the term paa4 ‘older aunty’ (although the
referent is the speaker’s classificatory aunt, not her actual aunt):
Example (6) (Speaker describing the location of another village.)
pe`q2 baan4 paa4+teng1
next to village auntþT
‘(It’s) next to Tengaunt’s village.’
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5.1.4.1 Maintaining differential perspectives to a single referent in
conversation Since standard formulations of initial person reference include
overt marking of social relation on a vertically oriented hierarchy, it often
happens that a referent individual occupies a social position between two
interlocutors. The result is that two speakers will use different formulations for a
single referent, not only for initial mention, but persistently, in successive
mentions throughout a conversation.
The referent in the following example is a man named Khamlaa.
Reference to Khamlaa occurs in a conversation between a group of six or
so women who are chatting during a break in a reed-mat weaving session.
The first reference to him is by Jot, who is younger than Khamlaa.
Accordingly, Jot formulates her reference by prefixing Khamlaa’s name
with qaaj4 ‘older brother’. In line 2, one of Jot’s interlocutors, an older
woman named Moon, does a partial repeat of Jot’s utterance (in line 2).
Moon is older than the referent individual Khamlaa, and accordingly her
partial repeat of Jot’s utterance in line 2 features a replacement of the
‘older brother’ prefix with the non-respect male prefix bak2-. This looks at
first glance like an ‘embedded correction’ (Jefferson 1987), that is where
one speaker replaces some component of another speaker’s previous for-
mulation, thereby achieving a ‘correction’, yet without having to disrupt
the progressivity of the course of interaction. The difference here is that
the ‘replacement’ is not treated as a correction. This differential for-
mulation for person reference is maintained in subsequent occasions of
reference in the sequence: In lines 4 and 9, Moon refers to Khamlaa
using the bare (lowest) third-person pronoun man2 (cf. Example (5)),
while in line 7, Jot refers to him using the familiar level third-person
singular form laaw2, mirroring the two speakers’ choice of prefix in
formulating initial references.
None of these choices raises an eyebrow. They are pragmatically
unmarked. Yet by their formal/semantic marking, they accurately respect
differential relations of social height between each speaker and the
referent individual. The ongoing different type of reference might be
expected to create disaffiliation among the speakers involved: For exam-
ple, if I persist in calling him Johnny while you persist with John, a
discomfort may arise that causes one of us to change and accommodate to
the other. In this context in Lao, no such discomfort arises. A possible
conclusion is that correct social positioning outranks any potential infer-
ence of disaffiliation due to contrasting formulation (i.e., by creating a
perception of unwillingness to accommodate and settle on a common way
of saying it).
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Example (7) (Speakers are taking a break from weaving and are chatting.
They have just noticed a car driving through the village.)
5.1.5 Pragmatically marked formulations of
initial references to persons
The previous section described default, pragmatically unmarked referential
formulations. We now consider some departures from these norms, before
returning to the defaults and the question of what they might be commu-
nicating beyond mere reference. We consider cases in which speakers for-
mulate initial references to persons in pragmatically marked ways, thereby
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drawing attention to the manner of formulation itself for some interactional
purpose (Schegloff, this volume; Stivers, this volume).
5.1.5.1 Pragmatically marked selection of prefix One type of departure from
the norm in Lao person reference is to observe the prefix-plus-name format but
select a prefix that does not conform with the social relations pertaining. The
following example is from the scene in which Keˆeˆt and Kaap are visiting
Grandma and Grandpa. In this example, Keˆeˆt makes an initial reference to her
own younger sister Daaw. Owing to the inherent downwardness of the rela-
tionship between an older and younger sibling, Keˆeˆt’s reference to Daaw
would normally be marked by the non-respect female prefix qii1-: that is,
Daaw is referred to as qii1-daaw3. However, the present instance calls for
restraint. The purpose of the utterance in which Keˆeˆt first mentions Daaw is to
move into discussion of the main business of Keˆeˆt’s visit to Grandpa and
Grandma. It concerns the donation of money by Daaw (who lives abroad), for
renovations to the temple in Grandma and Grandpa’s village. (Grandma and
Grandpa are Daaw’s parents-in-law; i.e., one of their sons is married to Daaw.)
Keˆeˆt’s reference to Daaw is prefixed not by the expected non-respect prefix
qii1- but by saaw3 ‘MyZ’, an ‘upwards’ kin term that technically refers to the
younger sister of one’s mother.
Example (8) (Referent is speaker’s younger sister, normally would use
non-respect prefix qii1-)
mu`øþkhu`u`n2 phen1 kaø thoo2 maa2, saaw3þdaaw3 hanø
last night 3sg pol foc pcl call come, MyZþD tpc pcl
‘Last night, shepolite called, Daaw3MyZ.’
The third-person pronoun phen1 that comes before the prefix-plus-name
mention saaw3 daaw3 in the same sentence is a respect form (see Table 5.1).
This higher reference is pragmatically marked for this combination of speaker
and referent individual. Keˆeˆt would normally use the non-respect third-person
singular pronoun man2 to refer to Daaw.
The formulation of this reference to Daaw, the younger sister and daughter-
in-law, is pragmatically marked, signalling that the speaker is doing something
more with this utterance than merely establishing reference to this person. The
content of the marked formulation provides the information needed to figure
out just what this special action is (Stivers, this volume). By referring to her
own younger sister Daaw as ‘mother’s younger sister’, Keˆeˆt both casts herself
in a lower-than-normal position (i.e., as niece), and casts the referent in a
higher-than-normal position (i.e., as aunt). While pragmatically unmarked
references presuppose the relations referred to, a marked usage such as this is
akin to a creative indexical (Kockelman 2005); Silverstein 1976), introducing
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a new (not previously given) type of relation to the referent by virtue of its
occasion of use.
In the next case, Xai makes reference to a man named Saaj, using the ‘older
brother’ prefix (line 4). The other speaker, Kou, is Saaj’s older brother, and
accordingly Kou refers to Saaj with the non-respect prefix (line 6). However,
since Kou is Xai’s ‘older uncle’, Saaj is too ‘high’ to be an ‘older brother’ to
Xai. It appears in line 4 that Xai is strategically using this person reference as a
means to raise his own rank, pulling himself up in position. This move is
entirely in line with his currently upwardly mobile status in life (he is about
fourty years old, a successful small-time entrepreneur, eldest son of the present
village chief).
Example (9) (Referent is Kou’s younger brother; Kou is Xai’s ‘FeB’;
thus, referent is too high to be Xai’s ‘eB’. Xai is upwardly
mobile.)
1 K deˆk2þnooj4 maa2 te`e`1 paak5 san2 phunø
child come from P dem far dist
2 qiik5 soong3 khon2
more two person
‘There are kids come from Paksan over there, another two.’
3 (2.2)




6 K luuk4 bak2+saaj3 phuu5 nu`ng1
child m non respþS person one
‘Child of Saajnon resp, one . . .’
In the pragmatically marked formulations discussed in this section, speakers
creatively manipulate the system to derive pragmatic effects concerning
position within the social hierarchy, in one case for purposes of politeness
(Example 9), in one case for Machiavellian purposes (Example 10; cf. Bloch
1971 on the notion of ‘tactical’ uses of kin terminology). Such examples are
typical in Lao conversation.
5.1.5.2 Omission of prefix A different type of departure from norms in Lao
person reference is to avoid altogether using the prefix-plus-name formula-
tion, and instead using the person’s name alone. In the following example,
Kou refers to Nick, a foreigner and guest, who is present in the context
(holding the video camera). Omission of the prefix signals politeness, deri-
vable by inference (i.e., whereby omission of explicit marking of the expected
‘non-respect’ form implies the intention to communicate respect). The only
appropriate prefix here is the non-respect prefix bak2-, as determined by the
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age difference.4 But the speaker refrains from using it. Thus, if the only
available prefix clashes with the ‘high’ status of the referent (i.e., where status
over-rides age, by virtue of being a present guest), a safe thing to do is to drop
the prefix.
Example (10) (Kou ½m, sixty-five years is teasing an unmarried young
woman; referent Nick is present.)
nik1 vaa1 siø qaw3 phua3 haj5
N say irr take husband give
‘Nick said he’ll get (you) a husband.’
When Nick is out of earshot, Kou would normally refer to him using the non-
respect prefix, that is, as bak2-nik1. The respect inferable from the omission
of an expected ‘downward’ referring prefix in (10) contrasts with what would
be standard in informal village interaction. The following example shows
that a local of the village gets the non-respect prefix in a comparable
situation to (10) – that is, when he is present while being referred to as a third
person:
Example (11) (Mek, Kou, Xai, and Nick are standing around waiting;
Mek knows that Kou and Nick are going on a trip. He
addresses Kou. Mek is the oldest of the group. The referent
individual, Xai, is present.)
1 M me`e`n1 phaj3 de`e`1 siø paj3 niø
be who all will go tpc.pcl
‘Who all is going?’
2 K soong3 khon2 saam3 khon2
two person three person
‘Two (of us), three (of us).’½Pointing to Xai, present
3 M bak2+saj2 ka0 si0 paj3
m non respþSaj so will go
‘So Sajnon resp is going too.’
There are classes of situation in which the ‘zero prefix’ solution is standard.
One such situation concerns newlyweds, that is after they should no longer
be using the ‘older brother’ and ‘younger sister’ prefixes (see (2)), and
before they are able to use teknonyms (since they don’t have children yet).
This operates by a logic of refraining from undesirable options, and perhaps
works by means of depriving the liminal pair of any true default option at
all – that is, all references will be pragmatically marked. The omission of
4 Another possibility is that Kou could transpose, and say qaaj4-nik1 ‘elder brother Nick’,
choosing the term that his interlocutor would have used (i.e., assuming the perspective of his
interlocutor).
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title prefix to a name works by not overtly putting the referent into any kind
of social position relative to the speaker. Since to omit such reference is
pragmatically marked, the effect of such omission is to be heard as overtly
refraining from specifying the referent as socially positioned relative to
oneself.
5.1.6 Summary: the Lao person-reference system
The Lao person-reference system standardly requires explicit attention to
relative social positioning among people in the village setting. Pragmatically
marked forms of person reference in Lao exploit the default status of the prefix-
plus-name format, where the prefix situates the referent in terms of social
structure (calculated as kinship, at least for ‘upward-looking’ references)
relative to the speaker. The pragmatically marked uses derive their effects
either by use of unexpected selection of prefix level (either creatively raising or
lowering the referent, with the available implication of thereby lowering or
raising the self), or by omitting any prefix and refraining from any explicit
statement of social position of referent to speaker.
In the Lao system, while the default manner of formulation for person
reference produces expressions that are by definition unmarked pragmatically,
these expressions are explicitly marked, formally and semantically. We now
consider implications of this for a general theory of person reference, and for
associated issues of social action bymeans of the deployment of symbolic code
(language) in interaction.
5.2 Default formulations and what they do
5.2.1 How default formulations work
In conversation, the continuous flow of collaborative action puts a heavy load on
an individual’s cognitive processing. It is reasonable to expect that this load will
be minimized where possible (Gigerenzer et al. 1999; Zipf 1949). One type of
solution is to automatize processing (in both formulation and interpretation) by
assuming defaults. Current work in developmental and evolutionary psychology
suggests that we are cognitively disposed to adopt locally learned defaults as a
matter of principle (Boyd and Richerson 2005; Gergely and Csibra 2006; Simon
1990). Unquestioningly adopting convention requires a little trust, but is easy,
and makes good sense statistically (Gigerenzer et al. 1999; Richerson and Boyd
2005). Culture is the supplier of such default conventions for all manner of
communicative behaviour and background (Enfield 2000; Levinson 1995).
Hence, we come to communication armed with maxim-like common expecta-
tions (Grice 1989), shared bases upon which to apply interpretative strategies to
what’s being perceptibly said and done in interaction.
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Whatever a person says, they have to say it in some way. If we had to ask
ourselves upon hearing every piece of every utterance, ‘Why is this person
saying that in that way?’, we would unnecessarily (and, probably, unbear-
ably) overburden our inferential and interpretative processing.5 Default, publicly
shared, common assumptions about how people typically do and say things
provide interpretative channels along which we may travel with minimal cog-
nitive effort. The default is a device by which we can routinely suppress our
attention to manner of formulation, and against which we may recognize when
something is being done in an unusual way (being then able to ask ourselves why
that might be). When a communicative action is done in the default way, the
manner of action itself must at some level be recognizable as irrelevant to our
task of interpreting what’s ‘being done’ by that communicative action. It’s
against the background of this default that we may recognize the departures, and
only then actively apply our rational interpretation:why that now?6 (Grice
1989, Schegloff 1996a, b) Further, to calculate what’s being done, it’s not just a
matter of ‘why that?’ but also of ‘why not the usual’?; see introduction, and
Stivers, this volume. In short, the special role of defaults for communicative
formulation is that they allow us to hear what people are saying without always
having to wonder why they are saying it like that and not in some other way.
This disattention is the basis of Schegloff’s (1996a) claim that defaults do not,
and by definition cannot, ‘do work’ in social interactional terms.
5.2.2 How defaults are disarmed in conversation
analysis by a Members-Only Filter
The defaults argument just outlined is implied by Grice (1975, 1989) and
descendents (e.g., Levinson 2000), and is standardly employed in Conversa-
tion Analysis (although it is never discussed there in terms of economy of
cognitive processing). Schegloff’s (1996a: 439) argument that default person-
reference formulations make no contribution beyond mere referring is in line
with a fundamental methodological and analytic tool in Conversation Analysis
that I shall call a Members-Only Filter. Members are those people participating
5 The relative arbitrariness of the form-meaning mapping in spoken language is facilitated by the
phonological medium’s poor fit for iconic and indexical relations to complex ideas. This low
motivatedness of the modality is what allows us to best disattend to the specifics of manner of
formulation in speech. The greater the potential for iconicity in the modality of representation,
the harder it is to bracket out the implications of form selection, since if there is an easily
conceivable link from form to meaning, then it may be readily seen as a motivation. This is an
issue for comparative work between signed and spoken modalities of language (cf. Kendon
1988; Taub 2001; Emmorey 2002; Meier et al. 2002; Liddell 2003, inter alia).
6 This is exactly analogous to the finding of Gergely et al. (2002) about the earliest signs of
rationality in infants. This kind of reasoning is fundamental to our cognition, and is well in
place before we have language or other complex interactional skills (Gergely and Csibra 2006).
See also Sperber and Wilson (1995).
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in interactions that comprise the data set for analysis (Garfinkel 1967; Sacks
1992). This filter allows the radar screen to display only those actions that are
both ‘available to’ and ‘oriented to by’ the interactants involved.
Methodologically, the Members-Only Filter is intended to determine for the
analyst what will, and what will not, be counted for consideration as relevant to
the interaction and its analysis. For the conversation analyst looking to identify
social actions being accomplished in interaction, this filter lets through only those
candidate actions that afford ‘some demonstration that the interlocutors in the
data being examined have understood the utterances (or other conduct) in
question to be possibly doing the proposed action(s) or that they are oriented to
that possibility – a demonstration ordinarily grounded in the interlocutors’ sub-
sequent talk or conduct’ (Schegloff 1996b: 172). These interpretative conclusions
and the social actions they recognize must be ‘available in the talk’ (Heritage and
Atkinson 1984: 8 – 9; cf.Sacks 1992; Schegloff and Sacks 1973). But what
exactly does it mean for something to be ‘available in the talk, available for
inspection’ (by interactants and analysts alike)? In one sense of available – let’s
call it formally available – something is explicitly coded in communicative
behaviour. It can be pointed to.7 An example is the system of Lao kin prefixes
described in this chapter. In a second sense of available – let’s call it contextually
available – something is accessible by being in the shared common ground (Clark
1996). For example, the commonly assumed access to linguistic paradigmatic
structures allows us to make inferences based on what has not been said. If a
speaker uses a T pronoun form when a V form was openly appropriate, it is
formally available that the speaker chose the T form. In addition, it is
contextually available that the speaker could have chosen the V form,
and thus that they chose not to use theV form. This kind of availability directs
your attention to what is missing, a critical notion in both Gricean pragmatics
and conversation analysis. For a communicative action to be ‘officially absent’
(Schegloff 1968: 1083), hearers need to have stored what the contextually
equivalent (i.e., paradigmatically related) options at that moment of inaction
might have been. Such presumed or inferred pieces of meaning are contextually
available, but not literally present in the talk, that is, not formally available.
But however we define it, availability alone isn’t enough for the Members-
Only Filter. Even when something is explicitly available in the talk (such as the
hierarchical differentiation of social relations encoded in Lao person-reference
title prefixes), if interactants aren’t also demonstrably ‘oriented to’ it – that is,
displaying some kind of awareness, attention, recognition – it is said to be
7 Sometimes people will recognize it when it is pointed out, and find it so obvious that pointing it
out at all is odd; for example, that the word table refers to a table. In other cases, they might not
have noticed or thought about it before its being pointed out; for example, that Cinderella
(availably!) incorporates the word cinder, indexing her line of work.
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irrelevant to the organization of the interaction, and therefore to its description
and analysis.8 In the case of person reference, default formulations are said to
be doing nothing but referring because they are not explicitly ‘oriented to’ by
participants. In this view, it’s not enough that the content in question is merely
made available.
5.2.3 What remains unseen depends on where your blind spot is
In the Lao system of person reference, while overt specifications of kinship and
other hierarchical social relations are unmarked or default in pragmatic terms,
they are overtly marked both formally and semantically. These markings make
explicit a person’s hierarchical position relative to others in the social network,
an important principle in Lao speakers’ cultural understanding of personhood
and society. A Members-Only Filter would reject any claim that speakers are
‘doing’ anything in social – interactional terms by using these socially hier-
archical forms, on the grounds of a lack of ‘orientation’.
Kitzinger (2005) delivers an important challenge to this stance in a study of
verbal references to sexual relationships in English conversation (see also
Land and Kitzinger 2005). On the one hand, in conversation, gay and lesbian
speakers are typically unable to make simple references to their same-sex
partners (e.g., as revealed by gender-specificity in English names, pronouns,
etc.) without either being taken to be (‘oriented to as’) topicalizing their own
sexuality, or resulting in an addressee topicalizing it. In a telephone con-
versation between Janice and a car insurance salesman (Land and Kitzinger
2005: 396–8), Janice says I’m wanting insurance for um two named drivers self
and spouse, which a few turns later is glossed by the insurance salesman as you
said you’d like to insure your husband to drive the car. Here, spouse is taken to
have meant ‘husband’. Janice is required momentarily to delay the conversa-
tion’s progress with a correction It’s not my husband it’s my wife, but without
delay gets back to the business of the call. A short time after, while waiting for
a response from his computer system, the insurance man topicalizes Janice’s
same-sex marriage, resulting in an extended sequence of apologies and
remarks on the heterosexist assumption. By contrast, heterosexual speakers run
little risk of their sexuality being foregrounded when they reveal it to inter-
locutors in exactly the same simple ways (e.g., gender of names, pronouns,
words like wife). They make public their heterosexuality entirely in passing, as
8 In semiotic terms, the conversation analyst insists on a perceptible interpretant (i.e., a relevant
response to the sign that may also be taken to be a response to the sign’s meaning, providing
evidence for that meaning – cf. Kockelman 2005; Peirce 1965/1932). The semanticist is
looking for an object (in the Peircean sense; i.e., the meaning, in cognitive or abstract terms): as
long as he has a sign (e.g., an identifiable word), the semanticist is happy to supply his own
interpretant (or bracket the interpretant altogether).
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‘a commonplace and taken-for-granted feature of social interaction’ (Kitzinger
2005: 259). Thus, if a woman statesMy husband isn’t very well during a call to
a doctor’s office (Land and Kitzinger 2005:388, citing Drew 2006), she is
unlikely to be taken to be (or ‘oriented to as’) topicalizing her sexual orien-
tation, although she is nevertheless explicitly making it available.
In concluding her discussion on the distinct un-remarkability of speakers’
revealing their heterosexuality in English, Kitzinger (2005: 259) writes: ‘As
analysts, we might want not to take a member’s perspective on this but rather to
treat the interactant’s everyday world as problematic . . . ½We might ask what
is happening when nothing special is happening: . . . when presumed ordinary
experiences are treated as ordinary – what is happening then, how is that
done, and what kind of a world must we be living in that these things run off
smoothly?’
There is a clear parallel between the apparent invisibility of the heterosexist
assumption in English person reference (associated with gender of pronouns,
gender-specificity of names, relational terms like husband and wife, among
further things) and the apparent invisibility of social hierarchy in Lao person-
reference kin titles. For some things to go so unquestioned that their explicit
display is unnoticed (but not by all!), we have to be living in a kind of world
where people assume just that thing to be the default in interaction. And it is not
a matter of what people actually assume (e.g., that people are heterosexual),
but of what they assume will generically be assumed by others (Enfield 2002:
16 – 17). Adopting the attitude of a ‘generalized other’ is what situates the
individual in society and culture (Mead 1934). At the micro-level this matters
only as a principle of agreement for communicative pragmatics. When we ask
how a particular interpretative convention has come about socio-historically,
we may well ask why that? Why is that the default and not something
else? In the case of Lao kin prefixes, the encoded meaning reflects the con-
ventional way of doing person reference. The social distinction encoded in the
choice of marking reference to Khamlaa5with an ‘older brother’ or a ‘younger
brother’ prefix (see Example (7)) is as invisible and unremarkable in default
usages as would be the heterosexuality indexed by a woman’s passing use of
the term my husband in referring to her husband.9 When a Lao speaker
9 Any difference between cultures in this respect is not a difference in assumptions about the
way of the world. That is, in both Laos and England, interactants are necessarily of different
ages relative to each other. The difference between the cultures here is in what is habitually
made explicit in talk. English speakers don’t systematically make relative age/rank available
in language. From a Lao perspective, we studiously avoid it, perhaps like the way a lesbian
may be perceived to avoid certain types of relationship references (Kitzinger 2005:258). One
has to be a member of another culture to ‘see’ the social hierarchy so ubiquitous in Lao person
reference (Whorf 1956) – I’m not aware of a stigmatized sub-culture among Lao speakers for
which such social-hierarchical assumptions are problematic, but one could conceivably exist
(e.g., among young people in a globalizing world).
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explicitly encodes such a relation in person reference, as described in this
chapter, she might not be topicalizing it or drawing attention to it in the sense of
making it the business of the utterance in which it is embedded. But she is
nonetheless explicitly encoding it. This is reason enough to suspect that these
encoded social relations are serving socially communicative ends. At the very
least they convey a routine willingness to make key social relations public,
thereby reasserting, reiterating, and reproducing these core cultural concerns.
Such unceasing yet entirely automatized attention to accurate representation of
hierarchical social relations in talk is a contribution all Lao-speaking indivi-
duals make to the stability of Lao (speaking) cultural values.
Consider what might be ‘available yet not oriented to’ in a more familiar
person-reference system, English. The argument based on Lao data may seem
straightforward, since the cultural value at hand is explicitly articulated; that is,
hierarchical person reference based on asymmetrical kinship. To turn it
around, the Lao system of person reference points to what is available yet
automatized in the defaults of the English system. When Lao speakers make
person references using a name with a kin prefix, they overtly encode that
person’s differential social position, publicly reproducing a specific cultural
value – we’re all at different positions on an unequal hierarchy – each time they
do it. From the outside, we might see this as an obsession with hierarchy.
Similarly, when English speakers make person references using a bare name,
they not only achieve reference (i.e., convey to their addressee who it is they
are talking about), but in addition they make available a virtual assertion of that
person’s non-differential position, publicly reproducing a specific Anglo
cultural value – we’re all at the same level on an equal plane – each time they
do it. From the outside, one might see this as an obsession with egalitarianism.
This is confirmed in widely reported ethnographic observations on the social
advantages and disadvantages of speaking English; for example, the ease of
having one and only one second-person pronoun rather than being forced to
choose between formal/distant and informal/intimate forms; the discomfort of
having to call a superior by first name; the discomfort of hearing a subordinate
call one by one’s first name (cf. Brown and Gilman 1960; Wierzbicka 1992).10
While the Lao pattern is to overtly mark relative social status as a pragmati-
cally unmarked way of referring to persons, English has no overt marking. The
‘social statement’ in the English person-reference system is contextually
10 And default person reference by name in English is no simple matter. Even among first names,
there are multiple choices, with multiple meanings. We may not know in advance which of
Fred, Frederick, Freddy or Jer, Jerrold, Jerry is the default or pragmatically unmarked form
for a given configuration of speaker-hearer-referent. (Although we may know, for example,
that Jer, Frederick and Freddy are systemically marked, while Jerrold, Fred, and Jerry are
not; Wierzbicka 1992: 225ff, 303.) Furthermore, it may be argued that names fall into type
classes, and as such have (at least connotative) meanings (see Introduction to this volume).
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available but not formally available. But the English system nonetheless
embodies a cultural set of values concerning the social web of personal
relations.
While I am arguing against the claim that a default person-reference
formulation does literally ‘nothing more than refer’ (Schegloff 1996a), I
acknowledge an important insight behind that idea. It clearly matters that
pragmatically unmarked formulations pass in conversation without apparent
notice or attention.How can I claim that there is some kind of ‘work’ being done
by a distinction that apparently remains out of awareness? The answer lies in
Sacks’ observation, cited at the opening of this chapter, that it takes special
work to appear so ordinary that one’s manner of behaviour becomes literally
unremarkable. A key observation made by Sapir, Whorf, and others investi-
gating the relation between language, thought and culture was that much of
language is outside our awareness (Jakobson 1957). This motivated Whorf’s
quest to study languages unlike those familiar to Anglo-European scholars. On
the idea of a rule and our native conceptual access to it, Whorf wrote: ‘Never
having experienced anything in contrast to it, we cannot isolate it and formulate
it as a rule until we so enlarge our experience and expand our base of reference
that we encounter an interruption of its regularity’ (1956: 209). If a group of
people only saw blue, he suggested, ‘they would hardly be able to formulate the
rule that they only saw blue’. To be able to formulate a rule that they only saw
blue, ‘they would need exceptional moments in which they saw other colors’
(1956: 209). Part of Whorf’s insight was that we ‘march in step’ with distinc-
tions that have a ‘background character’ in our own languages. ‘½Our psychic
make-up is somehow adjusted to disregard whole realms of phenomena that are
so all-pervasive as to be irrelevant to our daily lives and needs’ (Whorf 1956:
210). This ‘disregard’ is another word for the Conversational Analysts’ ‘lack of
orientation’ (see above). Despite the message’s availability, its apparent dis-
regard by interactants is taken tomean that it should therefore be disregarded by
the analyst as well. But as Whorf pointed out, as soon as pragmatically marked
formulations are ‘isolated against a background’ they bring that otherwise
disregarded background into view. And it is no less real. As Lucy (1992: 37)
puts it, ‘we de-automatize our own language categories by contrasting them
with those of other languages.’ Contrast reveals what we habitually fail to see in
the most everyday phenomena. Something meaningful may be all the while
available in the data, but may take some pointing out before it is noticed or
registered or oriented to. When we think differently to the defaults (as, say, an
egalitarian in hierarchical society, or a lesbian in straight society), even for a
moment, the otherwise default becomes marked. Despite members’ typical
disattention to the routinely available in uneventful interaction, the analyst
would be crazy to ignore it. Consider the Lao case. That an entire society of
individuals agree to make an explicit distinction in fundamental social
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structure in every second spoken utterance yet find that very distinction
utterly unremarkable is in itself deserving of special interest.
5.3 Conclusion
In any society, an individual will occupy a set of places in a highly structured
constellation of social relationships. And any society will have its conven-
tional ideologies about the nature and structure of that constellation.
Accordingly, members of any society will follow fashion in expressing those
ideologies and publicly displaying their adherence to them. When Lao
speakers refer to persons in conversation, the normal pragmatically
unmarked strategy is to employ a formally and semantically marked for-
mulation, by which the mention of a person’s name is accompanied by
explicit statement of that person’s position, relative to the speaker, within a
hierarchical system of social relations. This pragmatically un-marked for-
mulation for person reference is explicitly doing more than simply achieving
reference, but this sense of ‘doing’ need not be the ‘foregrounded social
action now’ that the term sometimes implies (Schegloff 1996a). It’s one of
many things a person does by silently conforming, and the forms of con-
formity are, after all, not wholly arbitrary. Lao practices of person reference
do the basic work of referring to people, and, in addition, they make explicit
the social position of the referent individual relative to the speaker – above or
below, and if above, then classificatorily related to the speaker – for example,
as sibling, aunt/uncle or grandparent.
By the same argument, English speakers also unavoidably give off a
stance on social relationships when employing the person-reference resour-
ces made available by the norms of the culture. How could any language
give us a way out of this problem? I submit that it is not possible in any
context to refer to persons without encoding, implying, or otherwise making
available a stance towards social relationships that applies generally in the
culture. Indeed, this is just what perpetuates their status as culturally gen-
eralized. Formulations of person reference in any language system may well
pass without special treatment of the way they are formulated, but they may
always do more than just achieve reference. They make publicly overt and
thereby instantiate and stabilize cultural values about persons and their social
relations.
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